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ABSTRACT 
This article maintains that the price for inclusion in the World Summit on the 
Information Society – which finally has been achieved through the Working Group 
on Internet Governance (WGIG) – has been the erosion of an oppositional civil 
society within the summit itself. Specifically, it evaluates the development of the 
WGIG as a manifestation of global neo-corporatism. In doing so, the article 
addresses recurrent patterns within neo-corporatist policy concertation that is 
oriented toward satisfying neoliberal economic imperatives. The objective of this 
article is to provide an analysis of processes by which the diversity of interest 
representation that was characteristic of the first phase of the WSIS has become 
condensed into one agenda item focused on internet governance. 
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Introduction 
During the past 15 years, the United Nations has hosted a series of conferences and 
summits calling attention to the need for poverty reduction, environmental 
awareness, human rights, the elimination of racism, and the empowerment of 
women, indigenous peoples, and youth. At their best, many of these events have 
worked to increase awareness of both global interconnections and disparities in 
resources. At their worst, many of these events have produced impressive-
sounding declarations that are cast aside and action plans that never reach the 
implementation stage (Falk, 1998: 323). The World Summit on the Information 
Society (WSIS) is the most recent of these UN-sponsored events. At the time of 
writing, the second phase of the WSIS is underway, with a final meeting to be held 
in Tunis, Tunisia in November 2005, and so it is not possible to address adequately 
the question of whether this summit will follow or diverge from the prevailing 
patterns of past UN events. However, it is possible – even in a context in which the 
target is a moving one – to attempt a critical evaluation of the formation of the 
Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG), which was mandated by the WSIS 
Declaration of Principles and is arguably one of the few concrete actions to follow 
from the work performed during the first phase of the WSIS. 
Since the inception of the WGIG, numerous entities, including the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the Conference of 
Nongovernmental Organizations (CONGO), the UN NGO Liaison Service, members 
of the Internet Governance Caucus, and members of the WGIG, have reiterated the 
refrain that the working group represents a ‘best practice’ case for openness, 
inclusiveness, and transparency, one which models the potential for bottom-up 
modalities at the UN. Still, the claim to inclusion becomes compromised with the 
knowledge that, in the end, the manifold concerns that had consumed negotiations 
during the first phase of the WSIS had been whittled down to two agenda items, 
internet governance and financing mechanisms, with the former eliciting the most 
attention among stakeholders. The idea that a Digital Solidarity Fund might invite 
sufficient support to become viable seems to have evaporated once it became 
apparent that the proposed initiative enjoyed little support among the nations of 
the ‘industrialized North’. For all practical purposes, internet governance appears 
to be the only issue remaining on the official, inter-governmental WSIS table. 
This should come as no surprise to anyone who recognized that the WSIS 
would fall short as a forum for a pluralistic discussion on global communication 
policies. Notwithstanding the active involvement of advocates for community radio 
projects, press freedom, cultural diversity, and communication rights, the most 
powerful stakeholders representing governments, UN agencies, and the private 
sector had a pre-set, neoliberal agenda focused on ‘harnessing the power’ of new 
information technologies, particularly the internet, in order to ‘unleash the 
entrepreneurial spirit’ of peoples in lesser developed countries through ‘e-
strategies’, while addressing social needs such as healthcare and education through 
‘e-health’ and ‘e-education’ initiatives.1 As the first phase of the WSIS unfolded, it 
became clear that, above all else, this was the ‘internet summit’.  
In this article, we situate the mission of the WGIG within a larger milieu that 
illuminates what is happening in respect to global communication policy in general 
and internet governance in particular. In the following pages, we place our 
approach to the WGIG within a theoretical framework which draws from a critique 
of neo-corporatist policy arrangements that are oriented to satisfying neoliberal 
economic imperatives. Neo-corporatism is the contemporary version of a 
longstanding approach to policymaking known as corporatism. As a strategy for 
policy concertation, corporatism was originally adopted to maintain social 
equilibrium in the welfare state by welcoming labor unions into cooperative 
relations with business interests and the state on matters of economic policy-
making. Now, this policy strategy has ‘gone global’ and has been reinvented as a 
way of mainstreaming civil society into the policy processes of the UN (McLaughlin, 
2004).  
Our purpose is not to challenge the status of internet governance as a critical 
issue to address within the context of the WSIS. Rather, it is to move beyond the 
rhetoric of ‘openness and inclusion’ that surrounds the WGIG in order to 
understand how the emphasis on internet governance, and therefore the creation 
of a working group formed around this issue, has been produced through the 
complex interplay among mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion that characterizes 
global neo-corporatist policy concertation.  
 
The Working Group on Internet Governance  
On 12 December 2003, during the week of events that marked the conclusion of 
the first phase of the WSIS, the ITU issued a news release, which, although self-
congratulatory about the summit’s accomplishments, pointed to two unresolved 
issues. One of these was the question of how internet governance should be 
approached, with a primary focus on whether the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) or another UN agency – most likely the ITU 
– should have responsibility for technical management of internet activities such as 
overseeing the domain naming system (DNS). Governmental negotiations had 
failed to produce a consensus on matters related to technical and public policy 
dimensions of internet governance during the first phase of the summit. Therefore, 
the WSIS Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action requested that Secretary-
General Kofi Annan form a Working Group on Internet Governance to facilitate 
negotiations during the second phase of the summit. 
The WGIG was specifically charged with defining ‘Internet Governance’, 
identifying relevant public policy issues and developing ‘a common understanding 
of the respective roles and responsibilities of governments, existing international 
organizations and other forums as well as the private sector and civil society from 
both developing and developed countries’ (WSIS, 2003). Assigned the task to 
‘investigate and make proposals for action, as appropriate, on the governance of 
the internet by 2005’, the WGIG’s primary deliverable is a report due out in July 
2005. The proposal will be presented for ‘consideration and appropriate action’ at 
the conclusion of the second phase of the WSIS in Tunis in November 2005 
(www.wgig.org).2  
Consultations regarding the formation of the WGIG commenced in early 
2004 and were spread across numerous international fora that were purportedly 
held in an ‘open mode’, allowing for wide participation from the tripartite 
configuration of civil society, governments and private sector entities. Markus 
Kummer, the Swiss diplomat who was appointed coordinator of the WGIG, voiced 
his support for an ‘open and inclusive’ process in which selection of members 
would be conducted in such a manner that representatives from the triad of 
governments, civil society, and the private sector would each comprise roughly 
one-third of the membership. The WGIG secretariat began in July of 2004, chaired 
by Nitin Desai, special Advisor to the Secretary-General for the WSIS. The WGIG 
agreed to schedule four ‘open and inclusive’ meetings oriented to maximizing 
transparency. Because the WGIG was constituted primarily as a ‘fact-finding’ 
working group and not a negotiating body, there was a degree of tentativeness to 
its discussions from the start. Some discussions have occurred online, while others 
have taken the form of both closed private sessions and open sessions meant to 
allow non-members to observe proceedings. In respect to the latter, observers 
have not been guaranteed speaking privileges. 
As a starting point, the WGIG identified as key issues the equitable 
distribution of resources, access for all, stable and secure functioning of the 
internet, and multilingualism and content. The first two WGIG meetings, held in 
November 2004 and February 2005, yielded a preliminary draft structure for its 
report, identified public policy issues, and produced a concrete timeframe for its 
work. A series of draft papers were submitted for consideration and are available 
on the WGIG website. Discussions at WGIG meetings generated several collective 
observations on internet governance, including that governance cannot be reduced 
to ‘government activities’ and internet governance encompasses a wider range of 
issues than simply internet protocol numbering and domain name administration. 
Members also agreed that there must be a practical basis for distinguishing 
between technical and public policy issues. The working group agreed to take up 
four key issues, which were clustered as follows: 
• Issues relating to infrastructural issues and the management of critical internet 
resources, including administration of the domain name system and IP 
addresses, administration of the root server system, technical standards, peering 
and inter-connection, telecommunications infrastructure including innovative 
and converged technologies, as well as multilingualization 
• Issues relating to the use of the internet, including spam, network security, and 
cybercrime 
• Issues which are relevant to the internet, but with impact much wider than the 
internet, where there are existing organizations responsible for these issues, 
such as IPR or international trade 
• Issues relating to developmental aspects of internet governance, in particular 
capacity building in developing countries, gender issues and other access 
concerns (Working Group on Internet Governance, 2004–5). 
As the WGIG’s issue clusters indicate, the decision was made to take an 
expansive approach so long as doing so would not render meaningless the 
definition of ‘internet governance’ (Peake, 2004). This is in contrast to definitions 
of internet governance restricted to the workings of ICANN, a subject that is both 
technical and political but which seems to invite a focus on issues related to 
technical coordination of the internet via a specific organization. Still, there is no 
denying that government negotiations on internet governance during the first 
phase of the summit were centered primarily on ICANN and that the principal item 
on the agenda of the WGIG would be the administration of the domain name 
system, IP addresses, and the root server system.  
ICANN was a contentious issue throughout the first phase of the WSIS and a 
main motivation for discussion, as representatives primarily from countries of the 
global South challenged its role in internet governance. ICANN is a private, 
nonprofit entity formed under California state law in 1998 after four years of 
protracted debate over the technical management of internet activities such as the 
domain naming system (DNS). The specific set of functions assigned to ICANN by 
the US Department of Commerce’s ‘memorandum of understanding’ gave it the 
authority to set policy for, and to manage the allocation and assignment of, internet 
protocol addresses, add new names to the top level of the internet domain name 
hierarchy, and maintain responsibility for operating root servers that distribute 
authoritative information about the content of the top level of the domain name 
space (Mueller, 2002). In choosing who is entitled to a specific domain name and 
determining the number of IP addresses made available to particular regions and 
nations, ICANN has authority over the allocation of a scarce resource within the 
IPV4 system.3 ICANN also has the power to authorize the ways in which domain 
name disputes are resolved through its Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution 
Policy. These arrangements give ICANN a broad authority with far-reaching 
implications that have become increasingly controversial. 
Seen by many in the international community as the province of a small 
technocratic elite with ties to the US Department of Commerce, ICANN increasingly 
has come under fire for its lack of transparency and accountability and Western-
centric mode of governance. Furthermore, ICANN has generated controversy by its 
seemingly arbitrary and disproportionate allotment of highly coveted top-level 
domains (TLD) and internet protocol addresses that seem to privilege developed 
nations over developing ones. Most recently, ICANN sparked controversy by 
granting a top level .xxx domain name to an independent company, run by a British 
businessman, that will make it available for pornographic web content. This topic 
was cited by WGIG members, especially representatives from developing countries, 
in calling into question ICANN’s legitimacy as an arbiter of culturally sensitive 
issues. 
Building upon earlier discussions, at the third meeting in April 2005, the 
WGIG focused on ‘capacity building’ in developing countries and began drafting a 
questionnaire that sought input as a basis for the development of policy 
recommendations or proposals for action. This questionnaire focused on four 
topics: the need for an international forum; the oversight of internet governance 
and whether ICANN and the Government Advisory Committee (GAC) for ICANN 
should be replaced or transformed; the function and coordination of existing 
institutions; and how these processes might be coordinated between national and 
international decision-making arrangements. 
The fourth and last meeting held in June was devoted to evaluating feedback 
from the questionnaire. According to transcripts from the meeting made available 
on the WGIG site, several representatives, especially those from the global South, 
expressed opinions that a new governance body was needed to replace ICANN. 
Also predictably, WGIG members from the International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC) and the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), whose representative works 
for IBM, suggested that the current state of affairs was optimal and that the unique 
nature of the internet naturally gives rise to a user-driven democracy that was not 
amenable to centralized regulation. The opinions of representatives from these 
two organizations reinforce the position of the United States, whose State 
Department has released statements which welcome international dialogue and 
cooperation on matters of internet governance while remaining adamant that 
ICANN is the indisputably best model for technical management of the domain 
system. 
In prescriptive documents such as ‘The United States Approach to the 
Internet: Guiding Principles for the UN Working Group on Internet Governance’ 
(United States State Department, 2005), the US has advocated an approach that 
supports private sector leadership in internet development, adopts a market-based 
framework for internet governance, and offers universal access through private 
investment and competition. Perhaps ironically, the State Department also warned 
against adopting overly prescriptive approaches to internet regulation. 
 
Neo-corporatism@wgig.wsis.int 
Despite the stress on internet governance during the second phase of the WSIS, it 
is important to emphasize that none of the other issues that were addressed during 
the first phase have gone away. Some civil society organizations whose concerns 
were not addressed adequately during the earlier phase – groups that focus on 
issues related to gender, indigenous people, cultural diversity, human rights, and 
trade – have parted ways with the official process and have pursued dialogue and 
action in other, generally more open, fora.4 Other civil society organizations, some 
of which represent the above-listed interests, have remained tied to the WSIS, but, 
as Raboy (2005) points out, the various working groups and thematic caucuses now 
seem more institutionalized and bureaucratized than they were during the first 
phase. 
One trend that seems to be emerging among the remaining WSIS civil society 
groups is that many interests and issues are being channeled toward questions of 
internet governance. For example, the WSIS Gender Caucus Statement on Internet 
Governance, in welcoming the establishment of the WGIG and commending it for 
its adherence to a multi-stakeholder approach, requests that the WGIG ground its 
work in a framework based in human rights and development, gender balance, and 
the fostering of creativity, innovation, linguistic diversity, and social inclusion. The 
Gender Caucus’s call for an approach to internet governance grounded in such a 
framework is compelling and necessary, and, in addition, it might be considered a 
well-thought out strategy for the group to assert its relevance during a phase in 
which internet governance has been identified as particularly germane to 
governmental negotiations about the future of the ‘information society’. Surely, 
‘internet governance’ is relevant to human development today. However, 
bolstering a view of internet governance as a singularly important issue risks 
fortifying the established government and private sector view that access to new 
information and communication technologies is the panacea for closing the 
development divide. 
This sort of narrow, neoliberal notion of the ‘information society’ was 
rejected by civil society stakeholders in their very own declaration. During phase 
one of the WSIS, a great source of frustration for civil society was that, regardless 
of its numerous critical interventions, each government draft of the Declaration of 
Principles and Plan of Action appeared more technocratic and oriented to market-
led solutions to development than its predecessor. Finally, civil society agreed to 
craft its own declaration, ‘Shaping Information Societies for Human Needs’, which 
was adopted unanimously by its members during the December 2003 summit (Civil 
Society Declaration, 2003). The Civil Society Declaration eschews the technological-
deterministic notion that overcoming a specifically ‘digital’ divide is the answer to 
development: ‘The unequal distribution of ICTs and the lack of information access 
for a large majority of the world’s population, often referred to as the digital divide, 
is in fact a mapping of new asymmetries onto the existing grid of social divides’ 
(Civil Society Declaration, 2003: 7). In addition, the Declaration cautions that 
traditional broadcast media such as radio and television are often the most efficient 
means of providing necessary information within developing countries. 
Nevertheless, many civil society members who have continued to engage in 
official WSIS spaces are devoting a majority of their efforts toward carrying on with 
the governmental agenda, which does not necessarily diverge a great deal from 
their own respective agendas. Clearly, the majority of civil society activity taking 
place in connection with the second phase of the WSIS has been oriented to 
internet governance. Concurrently, many civil society members appear to have 
developed amnesia in respect to the breadth of what occurred during phase one. 
This has facilitated a scenario in which the conditions for civil society’s concession 
to the official, predetermined WSIS agenda are already in place. 
The risk of civil society’s experiencing an erosion of its oppositional edge in 
the face of assimilation may have been inferred in advance of the WSIS. Despite 
the discourse of ‘the new’ that has characterized the official pronouncements 
made during the WSIS process, we maintain that the summit’s multi-stakeholder 
modalities represent a supranational version of neo-corporatism. In 2003, the ITU 
Civil Society Secretariat’s web site described the WSIS as a ‘Governmental PLUS 
summit’ that will provide the paradigm for ‘new governance in the Information 
Society’. Perhaps more accurately, the mode of policy coordination set into motion 
by the WSIS is a new reinvention of an older policy scheme known as corporatism. 
The goal of corporatism traditionally has been to promote social integration and 
stability within highly advanced capitalist economies by creating cooperative 
arrangements among a limited set of conflicting social groups (Lehmbruch, 1984). 
Corporatist approaches have generally been applied to economic policy-making as 
a bargaining mechanism between the state and leaders of organized interest 
groups defined in class categories, with labor unions and business associations 
being the state’s key partners in this effort to promote class collaboration and ward 
off class conflicts which would otherwise challenge national political and economic 
interests. 
Concurrent with the growing influence of civil society organizations 
throughout the various 1990s UN-sponsored meetings, corporatism has taken on 
new relevance as the basis for understanding how policymaking procedures have 
been adjusted to meet the challenge posed by new political actors exercising 
authority within institutions of global governance. As the influence of labor unions 
has eroded and the power of groups promoting so-called ‘postindustrial’ themes 
such as environmental protection, consumer rights, and women’s rights has 
increased, corporatist states have created bargaining arrangements with the new 
interest groups as well.5  
Global neo-corporatism, despite diverging from traditional corporatism in 
some significant ways, is serving a purpose that is similar to that of the latter, with 
the UN responding to NGO challenges to international institutions and 
transnational corporations by promoting cooperative arrangements among 
international organizations, business, and civil society in an attempt to defuse 
radical opposition by co-opting more moderate groups (Dryzek, 2000; Offe, 1990; 
Ottaway, 2001). Liberal constitutionalists and some left-leaning critics are apt to be 
critical of corporatism, the former because it is an exclusionary approach that 
circumvents deliberative democracy and elected government and the latter 
because current neo-corporatist arrangements marginalize the working class and 
tend to guide progressive causes toward entrapment within the net of capitalist 
bureaucracies, whether at the national or supranational level. 
Conservatives such as Ottaway (2001) take a sceptical, and yet very different, 
view toward neo-corporatism, suggesting that global neo-corporatist policy 
arrangements have been forced upon the UN and the private sector because of 
demands that are made by civil society organizations making unsubstantiated 
claims to represent larger constituencies. Following from this, Ottaway suggests 
that the UN, as a sort of quasi-state, has been co-opted by civil society. In her 
conception, the corporatist state, or quasi-state represented by the UN, is the head 
of the body politic because it takes on the task of coordinating and reconciling the 
interests of the three sectors: the state, the market, and civil society. In contrast, 
the evolution of the WSIS towards a conclusion in which internet governance has 
taken center stage reinforces the argument that, within today’s tripartite forms of 
policy concertation, the market has become the head of the body politic 
(McLaughlin, 2004). 
This claim is not meant to suggest that the nation-state has become 
irrelevant. Rather, it is to maintain that, whether willingly or not, the majority of 
nation-states have shifted their priorities from meeting the social and economic 
needs of their various constituencies to satisfying the economic interests of multi-
national corporations and wealthy social classes (Keane, 1998: 34). Although the 
tension between these two sets of priorities weighs heavily upon the UN, it is, after 
all, an intergovernmental organization that tends to capitulate to the policy 
positions held by its most powerful member-states. 
As O Siochru has argued, by the time that preparations for the WSIS were 
underway, the ITU had already fallen in line behind the neoliberal banner and had 
‘swallowed undigested the ideologically-driven claims for the “information 
society”’ (2004: 213). The ‘information society’ is a label suggesting a brave new 
world marked by new dynamics and radical breaks with past relations – an 
ideological assumption connected to earlier post-industrial and neoliberal rhetorics 
that privilege easily commodified information over communication processes. 
Fortunately, for those who embrace this view of the ‘information society’, the 
dominant discourse about the internet avoids mention of it as a primary site for the 
development of informationalized capitalism (Dean, 2003; Schiller, 1999). Rather, 
as Preston (2001: 6) points out, it is more fashionable in our new millennium ‘to 
admire and enthuse over technology and its presumed social or economic benefits’. 
At a time when it is not practicable for governments to de-link from neoliberal 
globalization, visions based in technocratic and market-led approaches to 
development arrive packaged in the language of emancipation. Thus, the ITU Civil 
Society Secretariat described the WSIS’s orientation as ‘not technical but related to 
the advent of a globalized society in which the emancipation of the human being is 
in part related to the possibilities of communication and exchange of information’ 
(WSIS, 2003).  
In announcing the WSIS, the ITU offered a place at the table for all 
stakeholders with interests in coordinating local, national, regional, and global 
communication policies in order to overcome the ‘digital divide’ or ‘knowledge gap’ 
between industrialized and less developed countries. Nevertheless, it became 
apparent early on that, in allegedly offering a venue in which all stakeholders were 
welcomed, the WSIS process would unfold in such a way that, with few exceptions, 
everyone would remain in their place. Much of this is due to the fact that the 
summit was initiated with the impossible proposition that civil society and the 
private sector would participate on an equal footing with governments, despite the 
fact that: (1) the UN organization remains state-centric in its decision-making and 
consensus-seeking negotiation processes; and (2) the majority of its member-
states have become instrumentalized by neoliberal economic imperatives. 
The first of these confounds the use of neo-corporatist strategies as a way of 
satisfying the (quasi-) state imperative of legitimation. Neo-corporatism wards off 
threats to legitimation by bringing into deliberations various constituencies that 
have the capability to destabilize the political economy. Legitimation is secured 
when these groups agree to accept the political-economic structures that reinforce 
the status quo (Dryzek, 2000: 96). Several of the governments that comprise the 
UN successfully curtailed the full participation of civil society and the private sector 
by, among other things, preventing attendance at ‘closed’ governmental plenary 
sessions in Geneva and shortening civil society and private sector speaking slots at 
these events to a few minutes. As O Siochru (2004: 214) notes, when compared 
with governments, ‘civil society had a tougher task in bringing the wider issues and 
the huge range of diverse actors together in a coherent manner during the 
Preparatory Committee meetings (PrepComs) and the Summit’. Yet, the shared 
experience of exclusion, as well as the recognition that concerted efforts were 
needed to expand the summit’s discourse beyond the most narrow, neoliberal 
approaches to ‘the information society’, propelled disparate civil society groups to 
work together in a more harmonious manner than what may have been expected 
otherwise. 
Much of civil society was placed in the position of having to devote significant 
amounts of time to lobbying for inclusion, which took away from the time needed 
to advocate for substantive, human-centered approaches to overcoming the 
development divide. Nevertheless, while the recognition that the ITU had reneged 
on its promissory note provoked a struggle for access to WSIS proceedings, there 
appears to have been far less consideration devoted to the possibility that there 
might be costs to be paid for inclusion as well as exclusion. Drawing from Dryzek’s 
(2000) cogent description of (neo-) corporatism, we wish to focus on the key peril 
associated with inclusion in current policy deliberations. Although initial multi-
stakeholder invitations may be extended in the spirit of pluralistic dialogue, neo-
corporatist concertation both begins and ends with passive exclusions that are 
determined by virtue of which groups satisfy or threaten existing economic 
imperatives. First and foremost, the imperatives of states – and, by extension, the 
imperatives of the UN – are oriented to avoiding economic crises and maximizing 
accumulation. This imperative cannot be satisfied through redistributive policies 
because they ‘frighten the markets’ (Dryzek, 2000: 83). Consequently, however 
much they might satisfy the legitimation imperative, pluralistic approaches 
eventually corrode into the marginalization of groups whose aims do not coincide 
with the demands of the neoliberal economic imperative.6 
It is crucial to point out that such forms of exclusion are not simply imposed 
upon civil society. Rather, civil society tends to become a partner, although perhaps 
an irresolute partner, with governments and the private sector inasmuch as it 
develops internal hierarchical structures that produce a leadership that 
governments recognize as a partner (Dryzek, 2000: 97). But, because governments 
depend on corporations to keep the economy afloat through investments, business 
inexorably occupies a privileged position in policy deliberations (Dryzek, 2000: 18). 
As such, to qualify for government recognition as negotiating partners, civil society 
organizations must have accepted, or at least be willing to court, the idea that a 
‘win-win situation’ might result from consultations with both governments and the 
private sector. In this respect, the WGIG is perhaps the ‘dream team’ of most 
governments and the private sector. In order to enjoy the opportunity of 
participating in the working group, civil society representatives were required to 
accept the notion that the group is no more than a ‘neutral’, ‘fact-finding’ body. In 
addition, the WGIG is just inclusive enough to fulfill some of the most superficial 
requirements of representation. 
To be sure, the Internet Governance Caucus, as the coordinating body for the 
civil society’s nominations to the WGIG, as well as WGIG chair Markus Kummer, 
made good faith efforts to build openness, inclusiveness, and transparency into the 
process of choosing members of the working group. Internet Governance Caucus 
coordinators reported in June 2004 that Kummer would take a broad view toward 
internet governance and place high value on the diversity of the membership, 
attempting to achieve a balance between those representing developing and 
developed countries and highlighting the need for gender balance in particular. In 
addition, he indicated that criteria for inclusion on the WGIG would favor one’s 
having internet governance expertise over a person’s occupying a ‘high-level’ 
position. Similarly, the Internet Governance Caucus (2004), in its document titled 
‘Recommendations on the General Structure and Operating Principles for the 
Working Group on Internet Governance’, requested balance in representation 
between participants from the three sectors that comprised WSIS stakeholders and 
advocated for both diversity and the requisite experience in internet governance, 
with particular attention to regional and gender diversity. 
At the conclusion of the nomination process, the civil society members who 
remained involved in the WSIS process could claim some victories in respect to the 
constitution of the WGIG: nearly all civil society nominees were accepted as 
members of the group, civil society representatives constituted roughly one-third 
of the membership of the WGIG, and (however imperfect) something of a balance 
among the various regions of the world had been achieved. Nevertheless, it is 
notable that only one-eighth of the 40 members of the WGIG are women, thus 
emphasizing that the nomination process had failed miserably in fulfilling one of its 
missions. In its statement made in conjunction with the June 2005 meeting of the 
WGIG, the Gender Caucus stated that ‘we are distressed to find that the large 
number of papers published to date by the WGIG have only given gender the barest 
mention’ (Gender Caucus, 2005: 1). 
But, there is far more to understanding forms of inclusion and exclusion than 
what might be gauged by calculating percentages and counting the number of 
times that ‘gender balance’ is mentioned in a document. Following the first phase 
of the WSIS, the Gender Caucus reported that the group’s main recommendations 
had been incorporated into the WSIS ‘Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action’. 
Yet, the WSIS Declaration of Principles includes only a few references to women’s 
empowerment, gender equality, opportunities for women, and women and girls as 
‘special needs’ populations. The Plan of Action, adopted by the governments on 
the same day, features a couple of references to gender equality and inclusion, and, 
yet, in comparison to the Declaration, includes far more references to women and 
gender. There are consistent references to gender and/or women and ICT careers, 
employment opportunities in the IT sector, unleashing women’s entrepreneurial 
skills and enhancing ICT innovation through women’s training and capacity-
building. There are many references to women as informational labor but no 
references to educating women so that they might become familiar with the 
diverse policy approaches to internet governance.  
 
Conclusion 
So, what is bottom-up about internet governance? Despite the self-congratulatory 
tone of the few missives that have been shared with the rest of civil society by 
members of the WGIG, the requirement that its members have professional and 
technical expertise in internet governance guarantees that they are not emissaries 
representing ‘globalization from below’.7 As with the rest of us who have been able 
to partake in the WSIS process in Geneva, and now Tunis, the members of the WGIG 
are more educated and privileged than the majority of members of their respective 
societies. The seemingly de facto requirement that the majority of the WGIG’s 
membership has a grasp on the important, and yet arcane, machinations and 
language of ICANN not only buttresses the distinction between the WGIG’s civil 
society representatives and ‘the bottom’, but also hinders communication between 
internet governance experts and the remnants of civil society that are still hoping 
to use the WSIS as a forum for eliminating the development divide. In the end, it is 
at best utopian and at worst a conceit to make claims to represent the barely 
existent ‘globalization from below’ (Waterman, 2003). 
As of June 2005, the WGIG’s reported output has resulted primarily in 
procedural outcomes relevant to the coordination of the group’s efforts to 
document approaches to internet governance. The WGIG has garnered 
considerable praise for its accomplishments, notwithstanding the fact that the full 
content of the group’s discussions during closed meetings has not been disclosed, 
and in the absence of a final report of the group’s findings and recommendations. 
Civil society members – notably those who were on the nominating committee for 
the WGIG and those who are members of the WGIG – have cited the WGIG as a 
‘best practice’ example in itself and as a model for multi-stakeholder partnership 
relations in general. In this sense, the group that was mandated to become the 
most active among WSIS civil society stakeholders now mimics the ways of its 
sponsoring body, the UN, which prematurely celebrated its victory in respect to the 
WSIS. This is evidenced by the ITU Civil Society Secretariat’s earliest website 
remarks. More than a year in advance of the conclusion of the first phase of the 
WSIS, the Secretariat announced that the ‘new governance in the Information 
Society’ will be modeled by ‘the modalities of [the WSIS’s] open process’ in which 
states, intergovernmental institutions, civil society, and the private sector will 
engage in a ‘new dialogue’ as partners (Civil Society Secretariat, 2003).8  
Over two years later, on the date on which we have finished writing this 
article, and one day prior to that on which the WGIG report is to be completed, the 
US National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) has 
announced that, on the basis of moral and economic imperatives, the US will not 
relinquish oversight of root server administration to a private or public 
international body. According to the NTIA report, ‘the United States will continue 
to support market-based approaches and private sector leadership in Internet 
development broadly’ (NTIA, 2005). In the wake of this new development based in 
the old doctrine of US supremacy, perhaps it is time to think about the ways in 
which exclusionary mechanisms can benefit democracy by producing an 
oppositional civil society that does not risk becoming paralyzed through 
bureaucratization and institutionalization. 
 
Notes 
1 Despite the use of quotation marks, these various ‘e-references’ are not 
attributable to any one source. Rather, they are meant to draw attention to 
technophilic expressions that have become commonplace in UN and other 
governmental venues – language that, by the way, mimics that of the market. 
2 This article was written prior to the dissemination of the completed WGIG report. 
As a result, our focus is on the process by which the WGIG was formed, along 
with the activities in which the group engaged from its inception until 30 June 
2005. 
3 It should be noted that this ‘scarce resource’ is artificially scarce. If and when the 
international community agrees to move to the IPV6 system, potential IP 
numbers will increase exponentially and negate any risk of scarcity. 
4 Examples include events sponsored by the Communication Rights in the 
Information Society (CRIS) campaign and OurMedia/NuestrosMedia, as well as 
the World Social Forum and Incommunicado 05. 
5 Streeck (1984), for example, writes that, even prior to its adoption as a policy 
strategy contained within certain European countries in the 1970s, neo-
corporatism was proposed as a model for organized interests within an 
integrated European polity so as to govern a ‘mixed economy’. The forms of 
policy concertation that characterize the current European Union also are largely 
corporatist arrangements. 
6 As Hunold (2001) describes, pluralist and corporatist approaches to policy 
concertation have become more compatible in contemporary times, whereas, in 
the past, they have been understood to be competing forms of policymaking. 
7 Neo-corporatism prizes involvement by those who are able to abide by the rules 
of technical and professional expertise as a method for avoiding social conflict 
and disruption (Streeck, 1984). 





Civil Society Declaration (2003) ‘Shaping Information Societies for Human Needs’, 
URL (consulted January 2004): www.itu.int/wsis 
Civil Society Secretariat (2003) URL (consulted February 2003): 
www.geneva2003.org 
Dean, J. (2003) ‘Why the Net is not a Public Sphere’, Constellations 10(1): 95–112. 
Dryzek, J. (2000) Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, 
Contestations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Falk, R. (1998) ‘The United Nations and Cosmopolitan Democracy: Bad Dream, 
Utopian Fantasy, Political Project’, in Daniele Archibugi, David Held and Martin 
Köhler (eds) Re-imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan 
Democracy, pp. 309–31. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Gender Caucus (2005) ‘Statement delivered to the Working Group on Internet 
Governance’, URL (consulted June 2005): www.wgig.org/Meeting-June.html. 
Hamelink, C. (2004) ‘Did WSIS Achieve Anything at All?’, Gazette 66 (3/4): 281– 90. 
Hunold, C. (2001) ‘Corporatism, Pluralism, and Democracy: Toward a Deliberative 
Theory of Bureaucratic Accountability’, Governance 14(2): 151–67. 
Internet Governance Caucus (2004) ‘Recommendations on the General Structure 
and Operating Principles for the Working Group on Internet Governance’ 
(September 2004), URL (consulted June 2005): www.wgig.org/docs/csig-
caucus.doc 
Keane, J. (1998) Civil Society: Old Images, New Visions. Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press. 
Lehmbruch, G. (1984) ‘Concertation and the Structure of Corporatist Networks’, in 
John Goldethorp (ed.) Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism, pp. 60–
80. New York: Oxford University Press. 
McLaughlin, L. (2004) ‘Coordinating Empire: Cosmopolitan Corporatism and the 
World Summit on the Information Society’, paper presented at the Union for 
Democratic Communications conference, St. Louis, MO (forthcoming in 
Television and New Media (2006) under the title ‘No Investment, No 
Information Society: Cosmopolitan Corporatism and the World Summit on the 
Information Society’). 
Mueller, M. (2002) Ruling the Root: Internet Governance and the Taming of 
Cyberspace. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) (2005) ‘US 
Principles on the Internet’s Domain Name and Addressing System’, URL 
(consulted June 2005): www.ntia.doc.gov/ 
Offe, C. (1990) ‘Reflections on the Institutional Self-Transformation of Movement 
Politics: A Tentative Stage Model’, in R. J. Dalton and M. Kuechler (eds) 
Challenging the Political Order: New Social Movements in Western Democracies. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
O Siochru, S. (2004) ‘Will the Real WSIS Please Stand Up? The Historic Encounter of 
the “Information Society” and the “Communication Society”’, Gazette 66: 203–
24. 
Ottaway, M. (2001) ‘Corporatism Goes Global: International Organizations, NGO 
Networks and Transnational Business’, in Global Governance (September), URL 
(consulted January 2003): 
www.ceip.org/files/publications/GlobalCorporatism.asp 
Peake, A. (2004) ‘Internet Governance and the World Summit on the Information 
Society (WSIS)’, Report for the Association for Progressive Communications, URL 
(consulted June 2005): http://rights.acpc.org/documents/governance.pdf 
Preston, P. (2001) Reshaping Communications. London: Sage. 
Raboy, M. (2005) ‘The WSIS Prepares to Grapple with Internet Governance’, URL 
(consulted June 2005): www.crisinfo.content/view/full/799 
Schiller, D. (1999) Digital Capitalism: Networking the Global Market System. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Streeck, W. (1984) ‘Neo-Corporatist Industrial Relations and the Economic Crisis in 
West Germany’, in John H. Goldthorpe (ed.) Order and Conflict in Contemporary 
Capitalism, pp. 291–314. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
United States State Department (2005) ‘The United States Approach to Internet 
Governance: Guiding Principles for the UN Working Group on Internet 
Governance’, URL (consulted June 2005): 
www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/36166.htm 
Waterman, P. (2003) ‘Globalization from the Middle? Reflections from a Margin’, 
in Parallax, January–February, URL (consulted March 2004): 
www.parallaxonline.org/ expglobalmiddle5p.html 
Working Group on Internet Governance (2004–5) URL (consulted July 2005): 
www.wgig.org 
World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) (2003) ‘Declaration of Principles 
and Plan of Action’, URL (consulted January 2004): www.itu.int/wsis/ 
 
Biographical note 
Lisa McLaughlin is an Associate Professor at Miami University-Ohio where she 
holds a joint appointment in Mass Communication and Women’s Studies. She is co-
editor of Feminist Media Studies. McLaughlin has published a number of articles 
and chapters on feminism, media, and the public sphere, and, more recently, on 
feminism and the political economy of transnational public space. Her current work 
focuses on gender, ICTs and the corporatization of development as it has emerged 
under the auspices of the United Nations. During the first phase of the World 
Summit on the Information Society, she was the lead representative on behalf of 
the Union for Democratic Communications.  
Address: Mass Communication, Williams Hall, Miami University-Ohio, Oxford, Ohio 
45056, USA. [email: mclauglm@muohio.edu] 
 
Victor Pickard is a doctoral student in the Institute of Communications Research at 
the University of Illinois. He is an Illinois Initiative for Media Policy Research Fellow 
and has published articles in the Journal of Communication and forthcoming issues 
of Critical Studies in Media Communication and Media, Culture and Society.  
Address: Institute of Communications Research, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, 228 Gregory Hall, 810 South Wright Street, Urbana, IL 61801, USA. 
[email: vpickard@uiuc.edu] 
